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Abstract
This paper discusses a model where consumers simultaneously differ according to one unobservable
(preference for quality) and one observable characteristic (location). In these circumstances nonlinear
prices arise in equilibrium. The main question addressed in this work is whether firms should be
allowed to practise different nonlinear prices at each location (delivered nonlinear pricing) or should
be forced to set an unique nonlinear contract (mill nonlinear pricing). Assuming that firms can costless
relocate, we show that the free entry long-run number of firms may be either smaller, equal, or higher
under delivered nonlinear pricing. In addition, we show that delivered nonlinear pricing yields in the
long-run higher welfare and, consequently, our results support the view that discriminatory nonlinear
pricing should not be prohibited.
Keywords: Delivered nonlinear pricing, Mill nonlinear pricing, Asymmetric information, Pricing
regulation.
JEL classification: D43, L13, D82
1 Introduction
Regulation theory has been one of the more active areas of research in the last decade. However, regulation
of firm’s pricing policies has been almost neglected within this wave of research. This paper revisits the
issue of whether regulatory authorities should prohibit firms from practicing price discrimination among
consumers who differ according to some observable characteristic.
The currently accepted view that unregulated markets are more competitive has been justified by
economic theory using spatial pricing models. Most of the existing studies compare spatial discriminatory
pricing with the non-discriminatory mill pricing1 for a given market structure (see, for example, Norman
(1983) and Thisse and Vives (1988)). Under spatial discriminatory pricing firms can price discriminate
across locations, thus firms compete in each of them. On the other hand, if firms have to practice the same
price in every location, competition occurs only at the boundary of each firm’s market. As a consequence,
∗Finantial support from Fundação para Ciência e Tecnologia and Fundo Social Europeu within the III Quadro Comu-
nitário de Apoio - BD/857/2000.
1 Implicit in this comparison is the idea that without pricing regulation firms will practice discriminatory prices. Thisse
and Vives (1988) have shown that if firms are free to choose their pricing policy, in equilibrium, they will in fact price
discriminate even though this implies lower profits for all firms.
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for a given market structure discriminatory pricing is more competitive than mill pricing. However, as
pointed out by Norman and Thisse (1996), the previous analysis is incomplete if one does not consider
the effect of pricing policies on market structure since the incentives for entry are not the same under
both pricing policies.
Norman and Thisse (1996) analyzed the economic justification of firms’ pricing policies regulation
taking into account the effect of pricing policies on welfare for a given market structure and the effect of
pricing policies on market structure. They consider a circular model of horizontal product differentiation
where the location of each consumer is observable, and firms may price discriminate (delivered pricing)
or set a mill price (mill pricing). The free entry long-run equilibrium and its number of firms (number of
product varieties2) is computed for each pricing policy3 and degree of spatial contestability4. Their work
illustrates an important trade-off: as delivered pricing implies fiercer competition and lower profits, in the
long-run it acts as an entry deterrent and reduces the free entry number of firms. Therefore, mill pricing
always leads to more variety than delivered pricing. However, this higher variety is not necessarily welfare
improving. When relocation is costless, both mill and delivered pricing have too much product variety,
thus the equilibrium number of firms under discriminatory pricing is closer to the socially optimal one
and discriminatory pricing leads to higher social surplus. Under spatial non-contestability, the welfare
comparisons are less clear. In this case, there is too much product variety under mill pricing, but too
little product variety with delivered pricing.
The previously mentioned works consider linear prices: mill linear price is compared with discrimina-
tory linear price, in a setup where consumers differ according to one observable characteristic (location).
However, if consumers differ simultaneously according to some unobservable (e.g. quality preference) and
some observable characteristic (e.g. location - brand preference), we would expect nonlinear prices to
arise in equilibrium and the issue of whether firms should be allowed to practise different nonlinear prices
at each location or should be forced to set the same nonlinear contract in every location is relevant.
In order to study this issue, which has not been explored before, our work adds vertical differentiation
to the Norman and Thisse (1996) set up. This is an important extension since horizontally differentiated
firms competing in product lines are notorious in various markets (e.g., car5, telecommunications, airline
travel, etc.). Within this more realistic set up, we assume that firms have uncertainty about consumers’
quality preferences but observe their location (or brand preferences parameter). Under these circum-
stances, firms set price/quality nonlinear contracts that screen consumers according to their preference
for quality. The regulatory issue6 is then whether firms should be allowed to practice different nonlinear
price contracts at each location (delivered nonlinear pricing) or, on the other hand, should be forced to
2The free entry long-run number of firms has been interpreted as the number of product variety (see MacLeod et al.
(1988) and Anderson and Palma (1988)). When firms use delivered pricing, firms are seen to be redesigning the basic
products so as to offer the consumers’ optimal product specification: firms customize their basic/standard products. As
firms location can be seen as the basic products characteristic, the free entry long-run number of firms can give a measure
of the degree of product variety.
3For simplicity, they assume that consumers reservation price is high enough with respect to fixed costs such that no
firm has monopoly power in its market area.
4When firms is relocation costless we have spatial contestability and when looking for the free entry long-run equilibrium
we achieve the densest packing of firms. On the contrary, when location is once-for-all, we have spatial non-contestability
and, therefore, we achieve the loosest packing of firms.
5Ginsburgh and Weber (2002) study this multidimensional setting when firms use two-part tariffs (price/quality sched-
ules) with an application to the European car market.
6Regulation always acts upon discrimination in terms of some observable characteristic. In our model this characteristic
is location.
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set an unique nonlinear price contract (mill nonlinear pricing).
One interesting example where our discussion applies and which has been the subject of sizable debate
within the European Union is the car market. The recent policy stance7 strongly acts upon its distri-
bution sector stopping the practices upon which car manufacturers rely to prevent arbitrage (therefore
acting upon a crucial feature for price discrimination). Although not acting upon price regulation, the
economic justification of the European Commission is the need to create more competition working to
the advantage of European consumers: claiming that “the consumer should be in the driver’s seat”, to
build a single market may put pressure on price differentials8. By comparing delivered nonlinear pricing
and mill nonlinear pricing, our analysis uncovers some features that may be felt in the car market after
its distribution sector liberalization9.
Our work builds on previous results on nonlinear pricing under oligopoly. The framework we use is
similar to the one first presented by Stole (1995), who named it vertical uncertainty10. Stole studied
delivered nonlinear price contracts considering a continuous of consumer types. Delivered nonlinear
pricing with a discrete number consumer types was studied by Pires and Sarkar (2000) and Valletti
(2002) (they both analyze the locational equilibrium, the former considering price/quantity nonlinear
contracts and the latter price/quality nonlinear contracts). The discrete case analysis showed that when
firms use delivered nonlinear pricing, in equilibrium, there can be different market regions: monopoly,
intermediate and competitive regions. On the other hand, Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) studied
mill nonlinear contracts under discrete vertical uncertainty11. They analyzed a credit-market setting
where banks offer one menu of credit contracts (which include a gross interest rate and a collateral
requirement), and showed that those contracts and their screening degree depend upon the degree of
horizontal and vertical differentiation studying also welfare implications.
Focusing also on the discrete case, with two types of consumers at each location, the economic justifi-
cation for the pricing policies’ regulation is discussed in a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation
where firms set price/quality nonlinear contracts. Considering spatial contestability, we study the im-
pact on welfare and market structure of two pricing policies: discrimination in space (delivered nonlinear
pricing - DNP ) - firms offer different nonlinear contracts at each location - or uniform nonlinear pricing
(mill nonlinear pricing - MNP ) - firms are not allowed to discriminate among consumers at different
locations and they must simultaneously offer an unique nonlinear contract. Our results show that deliv-
ered nonlinear pricing may bring smaller, equal or higher product variety (free entry long-run equilibrium
number of firms) than mill nonlinear pricing and is always welfare-improving. Even when there is higher
excess of entry with delivered nonlinear pricing, the long-run welfare is higher than the one achieved with
mill nonlinear pricing.
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model and studies the linear city duopoly
case for each pricing policy. Section 3 extends it to a circular city model with n identical firms considering
7For more details see the new Block Exemption Regulation 1400/2002 - 17 July 2002.
8Brenkers and Verboven (2002) discuss the impact on competition from liberalizing the European car market distribution
system and show empirically that there may be a reduction in international price discrimination and price differentials.
9Davidson et al.(1989) study the welfare effects of prohibiting third degree price discrimination in the European car
market and show that in some cases price discrimination is welfare-improving.
10 Stole also discusses another type of uncertainty: the horizontal uncertainty case where firms are unable to observe
the consumers’ brand preferences but observe the quality preferences’ parameter. Spulber (1989) studies this case with
price/quantity nonlinear contracts and concludes that second-degree price discrimination is the firms’ optimal strategy. In
this analysis second-degree price discrimination leads to a greater number of firms (more variety) than linear pricing. See
also Spulber (1984) and Hamilton and Thisse (1997).
11They also study the continuous types case - Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1997).
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spatial contestability. Section 4 presents product variety and welfare comparisons for each pricing policy
in the long-run. Our main conclusions are presented in section 5.
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2 Linear city duopoly model
2.1 The model
Consider two identical firms offering nonlinear contracts (price pi, quality ui) to consumers distributed on
a unit length line (brand preferences space). At each location d, d ∈ [0, 1], there are two types of consumers
characterized by their preference for quality parameter θ: θ¯ > θ > 0. Both types are uniformly distributed
along the line, both having mass equal to 1. We assume that firms observe consumer’s location d, while
the quality preferences parameter θ is consumers’ private information (i.e., there is vertical uncertainty).
We assume that firms are located at d1 = 0 and d2 = 1 and have identical production cost for a good of
quality ui, given by C(ui) =
u2i
2 .
Each consumer type buys a single unit of a certain good and chooses the contract (pi, ui) that yields
the maximum net surplus (purchasing at most from one firm)12. If a type θ located at d buys at price pi
a product of quality ui produced by firm i, i = 1, 2, located at di, di ∈ [0, 1], his net surplus is given by13:
V = U(θ, d, ui, di)− pi = θui − t |d− di|− pi (1)
where t is a differentiation parameter (t > 0) and, as in other spatial models, t |d− di| measures the
consumer’s loss by not consuming her ideal brand. The differentiation degree, t, will be crucial for the
competition analysis when firms use MNP and for the competition intensity when firms use DNP . Also
consider k to be the asymmetric information degree, i.e., the dispersion of types’ preference for quality
parameters: k = θ¯θ
14.
Notice that (1) implies that, independently of their brand preferences, consumers with higher θ will
be willing to pay larger rises on price for a given increase in product’s quality.
2.2 Mill nonlinear pricing
Let us first consider the case where firms are not allowed to discriminate among consumers at different
locations: they must simultaneously offer an unique nonlinear contract (p¯i, u¯i and pi, ui) for all consumers
distributed in the line. All prices and qualities must be non-negative.
In general, under vertical uncertainty, when firms set mill nonlinear contracts they face a multidi-
mensional screening problem as they may use both θ and d as screening variables15. However, under our
utility specification, the sorting condition only holds with respect to θ, since:
∂ [− (∂V/∂u) /(∂V/∂p)]
∂θ
= 1 > 0 but
∂ [− (∂V/∂u) /(∂V/∂p)]
∂d
= 0.
Therefore, in our model, mill nonlinear contracts only screen consumers according to their quality pref-
erences. Consumers differ in their relative preference for the two firms but these brand preferences are
12When consumers are indifferent between buying from firm 1 or firm 2, we assume they buy from the nearest firm.
13We considered a general specification given by V = θui− θrt |d− di|−pi but restrict our analysis to r = 0 for technical
simplicity since for r 6= 0, brand preferences and quality preferences interact and we may have changes in the consumer
ranking since the consumer type who is willing to pay more a given u may be type θ consumers for locations distant from
the firm location. These cases are interesting but require additional complex computations.
14Notice that θ can be reinterpret as the inverse of the marginal utility of income, in a setup where consumers have
identical ordinal preferences but differ in their incomes. Wealthier consumers have lower marginal utility of income and
consequently higher θ. In this case, a high k (k ∈ [1;+∞[) is related to a high asymmetric income distribution degree.
15Rochet and Stole (2000) discuss with detail the multidimensional screening scenario.
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neutral with respect to quality preferences16 .
Under monopoly mill nonlinear pricing (see Appendix A), a monopolist located at dm = 0 always
stops selling to type θ¯ at a location further away than the one where he stops selling to type θ and there
are no local monopolies at least for one type (type θ¯) as long as t < θ¯
2
2 (henceforth we call this the
non-existence of local monopolies condition - NLM)17.
Assuming that t belongs to the previous interval, duopolistic firms may cover all the market for both
types or cover all the market only for type θ¯. Also firms may choose to sell only to type θ¯18 .
2.2.1 Market fully covered
When firms cover all the market for both types, firms’ demand is determined by the indifferent consumer
location for each type. From (1) if a consumer of type θ located at d buys from firm 1 she gets a net
surplus of θu1 − td − p1 while if she buys from firm 2 she gets θu2 − t(1 − d) − p2. Hence, the location
where a type θ consumer is indifferent between buying from firm 1 or from firm 2 is given by:
d˜θ =
1
2
+
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
2t
Therefore, firm 1 solves the following problem:
max
(p¯1,u¯1)(p
1
,u1)
µ
p¯1 −
u¯21
2
¶
d˜θ¯ +
µ
p
1
− u
2
1
2
¶
d˜θ
subject to:
IRP θ¯ : θ¯u¯1 − td˜θ¯ − p¯1 ≥ 0
IRP θ : θ u1 − td˜θ − p1 ≥ 0
IC θ¯ : θ¯u¯1 − p¯1 ≥ θ¯u1 − p1
ICθ : θ u1 − p1 ≥ θu¯1 − p¯1
FC : 0 ≤ d˜θ ≤ 1 for θ = θ, θ.
The first two constraints are the individual rationality participation constraints (IRP ) — the net
surplus of a type θ consumer, located at the indifference point, d˜θ, must be non-negative (notice that this
assures that any type θ consumer located to the left of d˜θ gets a strictly positive surplus). The third and
fourth constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints (IC) — firm 1 will set (p¯1, u¯1) and (p1, u1)
so that each type prefers buying the contract set for its own type. It is interesting to notice that the
incentive compatibility constraints do not depend on d. Thus, if they are satisfied at one location, they
are satisfied for every location. The last constraints are the feasibility constraints (FC) — for both types,
d˜θ must belong to the unit line.
16Valletti (2002) considers interaction between horizontal (brand) and vertical (quality) preferences, using the following
utility function:
V = U(θ, d, ui, di)− pi = θ (1− |d− di|)ui − pi.
In this case screening is feasible both on d and θ. However, this would increase considerably the complexity of the mill
nonlinear pricing problem and would require the use of recent techniques for solving multidimensional screening.
17Under monopoly delivered nonlinear pricing, the condition for non-existence of local monopolies would be less restrictive.
Therefore, we consider the limit given by the monopoly mill nonlinear pricing analysis.
18For all these cases we focus only on symmetric equilibrium solutions.
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Obviously, firm 2 faces a similar problem, with demands (1 − d˜θ¯) and (1− d˜θ). Notice that if the
incentive compatibility constraints of firm 2 are satisfied, then types θ and θ located to the left of the
indifferent consumer do not want to buy from firm 2 at (p
2
, u2) and (p¯2, u¯2), respectively. Therefore, firm
1’s demands are indeed d˜θ¯ and d˜θ.
From the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions (see Appendix B), two solutions are found:
Cθ¯ θ1
u = θ and p = θ
2
2 + t
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 + t
Cθ¯ θ2
u = θ and p = θ2 − t2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 + t
Cθ¯ θ1 corresponds to a situation where no constraint is binding, while IRP
θ is binding at Cθ¯ θ2 . In
other words, at Cθ¯ θ1 both types located at the middle of the market (indifferent consumers location) get
positive net surplus, but at Cθ¯ θ2 type θ gets zero net surplus.
The price contracts offered at these two solutions are very similar. In both cases the quality offered
to each type is the socially efficient one19. The two contracts only differ in terms of the price charged to
type θ consumers, p. At Cθ¯ θ1 both prices (p and p¯) are increasing with t, thus market power increases
with the differentiation degree. However, at Cθ¯ θ2 p is decreasing with t. This last result is due to the
fact that type θ indifferent consumer has a zero net surplus, thus when t increases p has to decrease for
the consumer to be willing to buy.
As we will see afterwards in more detail, the market is fully covered for both types for low levels of
t. When t is close to zero, all consumers get positive net surplus (Cθ¯ θ1 ). However, as t increases type θ
indifferent consumer starts getting zero net surplus (Cθ¯ θ2 ). When t increases even further the market is
no longer completely covered for type θ. Thus, Cθ¯ θ2 may be interpreted as an intermediate case between
full competition for both types and local monopolies for type θ.
2.2.2 Market fully covered only for type θ¯
When firms cover all the market only for type θ¯, demand from type θ consumers is determined by the
location where type θ is indifferent between buying from the firm and not buying at all. For firm 1, this
consumer is located at dˆθ1 where:
dˆ
θ
i =
θ ui − pi
t
. (2)
In this case, firm 1 solves the following problem:
max
(p¯1,u¯1)(p
1
,u1)
µ
p¯1 −
u¯21
2
¶
d˜θ¯ +
µ
p
1
− u
2
1
2
¶
dˆ
θ
1
subject to:
IRP θ¯ : θ¯u¯1 − td˜θ¯ − p¯1 ≥ 0
IC θ¯ : θ¯u¯1 − p¯1 ≥ θ¯u1 − p1
ICθ : θ u1 − p1 ≥ θu¯1 − p¯1
FC θ¯ : 0 ≤ d˜θ¯ ≤ 1
PCθ : 0 ≤ dˆθ1 < dˆ
θ
2
19 Simple computations reveal that u = θ is the socially optimal quality.
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The last constraint is the Partially Covered constraint (PC). Again, firm 2 will solve an analogue
problem.
From the KT conditions (see Appendix B), the following are some of the achieved solutions:
Sθ¯1 u = θ¯ and p =
θ¯2
2 + t
Sθ¯2 u = θ¯ and p = θ¯
2 − t2
LMθ1
u = θ and p = 34θ
2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 + t
LMθ2
u = θ and p = 34θ
2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2 − t2
At Sθ¯1 and Sθ¯2 firms sell only to type θ, at LM
θ
1 and LM
θ
2 firms sell to both types but have local
monopolies for type θ.
When firms sell only to type θ, IRP θ¯ is binding at solution Sθ¯2, but not at S
θ¯
1. Therefore, S
θ¯
1 and S
θ¯
2
have the same intuitions as the standard Hotelling model: for Sθ¯1, when t rises, the price rises; for S
θ¯
2,
when t rises, the price decreases.
When the two firms compete for type θ¯ consumers and have local monopolies for type θ consumers,
there are two possible solutions: LMθ1 (when no constraint is binding) and LM
θ
2 (when IRP
θ¯ is the only
binding constraint). The price contracts in these two solutions only differ for p. In both cases, firms offer
the socially efficient qualities and charge p = 34θ
2, which is precisely the price that would be charged by a
monopolist. At LMθ1 the price charged to type θ consumers, for whom firms are competing, is increasing
with t (market power increases with differentiation). On the contrary, at LMθ2 p is decreasing with t. At
both solutions, firm 1 sells to type θ consumers to the left of dˆθ1 =
θ2
4t <
1
2 . The type θ¯’s consumer located
at d˜θ¯ = 12 gets a positive surplus at LM
θ
1, but no surplus at LM
θ
2.
Until now we have described some possible equilibrium solution contracts under MNP , but did not
specify the set of parameters’ values to which each of them holds. The next section analyzes the symmetric
Nash equilibria as a function of the parameters’ values.
2.2.3 Nash Equilibrium solution
For some parameters’ values the KT conditions for the previous problems have multiple solutions20 . In
these cases we consider the global maximum solution21. To achieve the maximum profits’ equilibrium
solution, we proceed computing each solution profits covering all t and k. We will only have equilibrium
solutions for all t < θ¯
2
2 if k >
³
1 +
√
5
5
´
22.
Figure 1 shows the set of parameters’ values where each of the previously described solution contracts
hold. Figure 1 illustrates several interesting features of the equilibrium solution contracts as a function
of the horizontal and vertical differentiation parameters (t, θ and θ¯). First, for a given level of k, as t
rises we move to less competitive solutions. Second, the solution contracts depend on k.
20There are also some undetermined solutions. But since their profits are equal to the profits of other determined solutions
and their intervals’ limits belong to the determined solutions intervals’ limits, we can exclude them from analysis.
21 Since we only analyzed symmetric solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we cannot guarantee that the Nash equi-
librium described is unique (there may be Nash equilibria corresponding to local maxima). However, even if the Nash
equilibrium described is not unique, it certainly is the most reasonable symmetric equilibrium.
22Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) also get similar non existence of (pure strategies) equilibrium result.
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Figure 1: Duopoly Mill Nonlinear Pricing Contracts
Discussion of results under mill nonlinear pricing Under MNP firms set a unique nonlinear
contract for all the market. Curiously, some characteristics of the equilibrium nonlinear contracts are
similar to the well known results of mill linear pricing: for low t, firms face intense competition and sell
until the indifferent consumer d˜ who gets positive surplus; for intermediate t, firms sell until d˜ but the
indifferent consumer gets no surplus; and for high t, firms prefer to have local monopolies. When vertical
differentiation is introduced, this phenomenon happens for both types but as type θ is characterized
by a lower preference for quality parameter, the previous phenomenon results appear for lower levels of
differentiation for type θ23 . As it is shown in Figure 1, for a given k and very low levels of t, the market
is fully covered for both types, as t rises firms start having local monopolies for type θ, and if t rises
above a certain level there is no competition between firms as they have local monopolies for both types
of consumers24 .
When t is very low, there is efficient quality provision. We get separating equilibrium where firms
screen consumers and cover all the market for both types. However, for low k, as t rises firms tend to use
less screening since it becomes more difficult to set screening contracts and the ICs to hold. Therefore,
for low k and high t, firms prefer to sell only to θ¯ (first leaving surplus and then stealing all the surplus
of type θ¯’s indifferent consumer).
For high k, which means that the two types of consumers are very different and the separation of
the two types is easy, if t rises firms continue to use screening and to sell to both types (going from full
competition, to local monopolies for type θ and to local monopolies for both types). Therefore, for very
23For instance, for some degree of differentiation, we may have type θ¯’s indifferent consumer with positive surplus but
type θ’s indifferent consumer with no surplus or not buying at all.
24That level of differentiation depends on k. The higher is k, the higher is the level of differentiation needed for local
monopolies to hold for both types. As mentioned earlier, we will not discuss the case where firms have local monopolies for
both types.
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high levels of k, we get separating equilibrium for all t. For intermediate k levels, that is not the case
since we only get separating equilibrium for low and high levels of t (for intermediate t, firms sell only to
type θ¯, again, first leaving surplus and then stealing all the surplus of type θ¯’s indifferent consumer) and
for low k, we only get separating equilibrium for low t (when t rises we move to solutions where firms do
not sell to both types)25.
2.3 Delivered nonlinear pricing
Suppose now that firms are able to offer different nonlinear contracts at each location in the line
(p¯i(d), u¯i(d) and pi(d), ui(d))
26 . Since the two firms are identical, with DNP , the market will be split in
two equal parts and each firm has its own market area. Therefore, we will restrict the analysis to firm
1’s optimization problem within half of the spatial market: d ∈
£
0, 12
¤
- firm 1 market area27. Also, for
this pricing policy all prices and qualities must be non-negative.
When selling to both types firm 1 chooses, for each location d, the nonlinear contract that solve:
max
(p¯1,u¯1)(p
1
,u1)
p
1
− u
2
1
2
+ p¯1 −
u¯21
2
subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints:
IRθ¯ : θ¯u¯1 − td− p¯1 ≥ max {0,net surplus of buying from firm 2}
IRθ : θ u1 − td− p1 ≥ max {0,net surplus of buying from firm 2}
IC θ¯ : θ¯u¯1 − p¯1 ≥ θ¯u1 − p1
ICθ : θ u1 − p1 ≥ θu¯1 − p¯1
The individual rationality constraints incorporate the fact the consumer has the outside option of
buying from firm 2 or not buying. Thus, in order to induce the consumer to buy from firm 1, this firm
has to offer a net surplus at least as high as the one the consumer can get with the best outside option.
To determine the consumer’s best outside option, we need to compute for each location d the net
surplus when buying from firm 2. Following an undercutting argument, firm 2 will offer to the consumers
located at firm 1’s market area a price equal to its marginal cost, p2 = u
2
2 (from the zero profit condition).
The maximum net surplus that a type θ’s consumer can get when buying from firm 2 is the solution to
maxu θu − t(1 − d) − u
2
2 . The optimal quality is u = θ and the maximum net surplus is then given by
θ2
2 − t(1−d), which is positive only when dθ >
2t−θ2
2t = d˘θ. Considering k >
√
2, for t < θ¯
2
2
28 all type θ¯’s
consumers located at firm 1’s market area always get positive net surplus but that does not always occur
for type θ’s consumers. More precisely, type θ net surplus of buying from firm 2 behaves as follows:
25The previous results have similarities to Rochet and Stole (2002) and Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999). The latter
has an interesting exposition about the three effects that should be considered with mill nonlinear pricing: business stealing
or demand effect, the margin effect and the screening effect.
26To simplify notation we will drop the argument d for the remaining of this subsection. However, one should keep in
mind that at each location a different nonlinear contract is set.
27We would have a symmetrical situation for the rest of the line but with reversed firms’ positions.
28On account of the mentioned mill nonlinear pricing and local monopoly analysis we will only focus on these t limits.
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t type θ’s consumers located at d buying from firm 2
0 < t <
θ2
2 d ∈
£
0, 12
¤
have positive net surplus
θ2
2 ≤ t < θ
2
d ∈
h
0, d˘θ
i
have negative net surplus
d ∈
h
d˘θ,
1
2
i
have positive net surplus
θ2 ≤ t < θ¯
2
2 d ∈
£
0, 12
¤
have negative net surplus
Therefore, when 0 < t < θ
2
2 firm 1 must consider the following individual rationality constraints (case
1 ):
IRθ¯ : θ¯u¯1 − td− p¯1 ≥
θ¯
2
2
− t(1− d)
IRθ : θ u1 − td− p1 ≥
θ2
2
− t(1− d)
when θ2 ≤ t < θ¯
2
2 (case 2):
IRθ¯ : θ¯u¯1 − td− p¯1 ≥
θ¯
2
2
− t(1− d)
IRθ : θ u1 − td− p1 ≥ 0
and when θ
2
2 ≤ t < θ
2, firm 1 considers case 2 constraints for consumers located at d ∈
h
0, d˘θ
i
and case
1 constraints for d ∈
h
d˘θ,
1
2
i
.
Notice that if IRs hold then both types θ¯ and θ, will not buy from firm 2 marginal cost pricing (p
2
, u2)
and (p¯2, u¯2), respectively.
When firm 2 does not sell to type θ at some location d (within firm 1 market area), firm 1 might
consider to sell only to type θ¯ at that location. Firm 1 should maximize p¯1 − u¯
2
1
2 subject to:
IRθ¯ : θ¯u¯1 − td− p¯1 ≥
θ¯
2
2
− t(1− d)
and θu¯1 − p¯1 < 0.
2.3.1 Nash equilibrium solution
Since type θ’s individual rationality constraints change with t and d, we must solve two different maxi-
mization problems when firm 1 sells to both types29 .
Case 1 — Low t When 0 < t < θ
2
2 , the unique solution is characterized by ICs not binding and both
types of consumers indifferent between buying from firm 1 or firm 2. In its market area, firm 1 offers the
following two bundles at location d:
u1 = θ and p1 =
θ2
2 − 2td+ t
u¯1 = θ¯ and p¯1 = θ¯
2
2 − 2td+ t
29The KT conditions of firm 1’s problems are described in Appendix B. For more details on similar mathematical
computations see Valletti (2002).
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Thus, when differentiation is low, firm 1 offers to both types the socially optimal qualities and matches
the net surplus offered by firm 2. This type of nonlinear contract is offered in all locations of firm 1’s
market area. We call this solution contract the full competition one (FC) since firms have to give
consumers the positive net surplus they would attain by buying from the competitor. Since FC contracts
are set at all locations of firm 1’s market area, this scenario is called 1Reg.
Case 2 — High t When θ2 ≤ t < θ¯
2
2 , we achieve a similar result to Pires and Sarkar (2000) and Valletti
(2002). Depending on t and k, there may be three different regions at firm 1’s market area: ‘monopolistic
— M ’, ‘intermediate — I’ and ‘competitive — C’ regions (see Figure 2).
M I C
0
2
1d^d *
Figure 2: Three regions at firm 1’s market area, where d∗ = 6θ¯θ−3θ¯
2−4θ2+2t
2t and dˆ =
2θ¯θ−θ¯2−2θ2+2t
2t .
These regions are characterized by different equilibrium nonlinear contracts30. In all of them firm 1
sells to both types:
Region Contracts
M
u1 = 2θ − θ¯ and p1 = θ(2θ − θ¯)− td
u¯1 = θ¯ and p¯1 = θ¯
2
+ (θ − θ¯)(2θ − θ¯)− td
I
u1 =
θ¯2+2td−2t
2(θ¯−θ) and p1 =
θθ¯2+2td(2θ−θ¯)−2θt
2(θ¯−θ)
u¯1 = θ¯ and p¯1 = θ¯
2
2 − 2td+ t
C
u1 = θ and p1 = θ
2 − td
u¯1 = θ¯ and p¯1 = θ¯
2
2 − 2td+ t
Region M is the nearest region from firm 1 location (until d∗). In this region, firm 1 offers typical
monopolist asymmetric information contracts: only IRθ and IC θ¯ are binding, type θ¯ consumes the
socially efficient quality but type θ consumes a sub optimal quality (this region will be attained only for
low k). Between d
∗
and dˆ, we have an intermediate region, region I, where IRθ¯ is also binding and firm
1 faces more competition (firm 2’s contract offer is very attractive for type θ¯). In this region, firms do
not distort u as much as they do at region M , because their power to extract rent from type θ consumers
is limited. Finally, closer to the market’s center — region C, only IRθ¯ and IRθ are binding and firms face
vigorous competition. At region C, both types get the socially optimal qualities and type θ¯’s consumers
get the highest net surplus of all the market.
When firm 1 sells only to type θ¯, the contract offered to θ¯ is equal to the contract set at regions I
and C for type θ¯. Type θ does not want to buy the good from firm 1 under this contract, thus we denote
this region by C θ¯. The profits achieved are never higher than profits obtained by selling to both types
30Computation details are available from the authors on request.
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setting contract M . However, for high differentiation degrees (closer to NLM limit) the firm is better
off selling only to type θ¯ than selling to both types and setting contracts I and C.
Considering the conditions for regions’s existence and comparing profits of selling only to type θ¯ or
to both types we can draw a plot that reveals the set of parameters where different equilibrium solution
contracts hold (see Figure 3).
2 Reg*
3 Reg*
2 Reg**
4 Reg*
3 Reg**
Figure 3: Duopoly Delivered Nonlinear Pricing Contracts when t is High
where:
2Reg∗ C ([0, dC [) and C θ¯ ([dC , 12 ])
3Reg∗ I ([0, dˆ[), C ([dˆ, dC [) and C θ¯ ([dC , 12 ])
4Reg∗ M ([0, d∗[), I [d∗, dˆ[, C ([dˆ, dC [) and C θ¯ ([dC , 12 ])
2Reg∗∗ I ([0, dI [) and C θ¯ ([dI , 12 ])
3Reg∗∗ M ([0, d∗[), I ([d∗, dI [) and C θ¯ ([dI , 12 ])
dC =
θ2
2t and d
I =
6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2+2t+
p
4(θ¯−θ)2(2θ¯2+4θ2−4θ¯θ−2t)
2t .
Figure 3 shows that when t is high, closer to the market center firms sell only to type θ consumers.
Moreover, it shows that the number of regions in a firm’s market area depends on the parameters’ values.
Notice that locations d∗, dˆ, dC and dI depend on t and k, which means that the way firm 1’s market
area is divided depends on the parameter values. Figure 4 illustrates how firm 1’s market area is divided
for different sets of parameters’ values. For example, when k = 1.5 and t = θ2, firm 1 offers monopolist
nonlinear contracts to consumers located between 0 and d∗ = 0.125, offers intermediate contracts for
consumers located between d∗ = 0.125 and dˆ = 0.375, and, finally, for consumers located between
dˆ = 0.375 and dC = 0.5 the firm offer competitive contracts.
The first plot in Figure 4 shows that, for low k, there is a region M at firm 1’s market area and
that as t rises this region becomes larger, i.e., there are more locations where the monopolistic nonlinear
contract is set. This result is quite intuitive, when differentiation increases there are more locations
where matching the net surplus offered by the competitor to type θ is not a binding constraint and thus
competition is not effective.
However, when k gets higher, regionM becomes smaller and smaller till it disappears (see the various
plots in Figure 4). This happens because when k is high, the two types are very different and the net
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Figure 4: Case 2 - Firm 1’s Market Area
surplus offered by the competitor to type θ is much higher than the one offered to type θ, which implies
that IRθ¯ starts binding for locations closer to the firm.
Notice that the set of locations closer to the center where firms sell only to type θ increase with t but
also with k (see curves dC and dI in Figure 4).
Case 3 — Intermediate levels of t For θ
2
2 ≤ t < θ
2 the outside option of type θ depends on consumer’s
location. For d ∈
h
0, d˘
i
the best outside option is not to buy and we make the same reasoning as in the
last case. For d ∈
h
d˘, 12
i
the best outside option for θ is to buy from the competitor and we get the same
Nash equilibrium contract as in case 1. Figure 5 shows the Nash equilibrium for low and intermediate
levels of t (cases 1 and 3 ).
1 Reg
2 Reg
3 Reg
4 Reg
Figure 5: Duopoly Delivered Nonlinear Pricing Contracts for low and intermediate t
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where:
1Reg FC ([0, 12 ])
2Reg C ([0, d˘θ[) and FC ([d˘θ,
1
2 ])
3Reg I ([0, dˆ[), C ([dˆ, d˘θ[) and FC ([d˘θ,
1
2 ])
4Reg M ([0, d∗[), I [d∗, dˆ[, C ([dˆ, d˘θ[) and FC ([d˘θ,
1
2 ])
As expected, for low and intermediate levels of t, firms offer FC contracts closer to the market center.
It is interesting to analyze how firm 1’s market area is divided depending on the parameter values
(see Figure 6), for intermediate levels of t.
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Figure 6: Case 3 - Firm 1’s Market Area
For low k, there may be up to four submarket regions (M , I, C and FC). However, the monopolistic
region only appears for high t. As k increases, the less competitive contracts (regions M and I) are
offered at a smaller set of locations, and for k high enough only C and FC contracts are offered (see
Figure 6). Notice that the locations where FC contract is set do not change with k but decrease with t.
Discussion of results under delivered nonlinear pricing Under DNP the equilibrium contract
solution may change with the location of the consumer. The market served by a firm may be subdivided
in more than one region, according to the nonlinear contract offered. The nonlinear contracts may differ
in terms of the degree of inefficiency in the quality offered to type θ consumers and with respect to the
net surplus offered to each type of consumers. The quality chosen is always the social optimal for type θ¯
but may be optimal or suboptimal for type θ.
When t is very low, the outside option of buying from the competitor is very attractive at every
location in the firms’ market. Consequently, a large net surplus has to be offered to both consumer types.
Moreover, the net surplus that has to be offered to type θ consumers in order for them not to buy from
the competitor is so high that this type of consumers do not want to buy the efficient quality bundle
offered to type θ. Therefore, the quality offered to both types is the socially efficient one, and the net
surplus offered to each type is exactly the same they would receive if they bought from the competitor.
In other words, for very low differentiation we get full competition in all locations of the market.
For intermediate levels of t, the outside option of buying from the competitor becomes less attractive
and we may start having locations (closer to the firm, far away from the competitor) where for type θ
consumers, the relevant outside option is not to buy the good. In these locations the firm will be able to
extract more consumer net surplus from type θ consumers (and also from type θ consumers, whenever the
incentive compatibility constraint is binding). For locations closer to the market center we continue to
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have intense competition. For these intermediate levels of t, the number of submarket regions (each with
different contracts) depends on k. When k is very high, the two types are very different, implying that
the net surplus offered by the competitor to type θ is much higher than the net surplus offered to type
θ. In this circumstances, it is very likely that the relevant constraint with respect to type θ is to meet
the competitor net surplus offer (incentive compatibility is not an issue). Consequently, for large k the
efficient quality is offered to type θ at every location in the firm’s market. However, the contract set is not
the same in all locations, because the outside option for type θ depends on whether the consumer is close
to the market center or not. In other words, for intermediate t and high k, contracts are either C (closer
to the firm) or FC (closer to the market center). As k decreases we may start having more submarket
regions. The intuition is that for smaller k the net surplus offered by the competitor to type θ is not
so much higher than the one offered to type θ, which implies that the incentive compatibility constraint
ICθmay start to be binding, especially as we consider locations further way from the market center.
As soon as this happens, one starts having contracts where the quality offered to type θ consumers
is suboptimal. For intermediate k we may have a region where u is efficient and a region where u is
suboptimal, but with a smaller distortion than if there was a monopoly. And for low k we may have
monopolistic, intermediate and competitive regions (but always with FC contracts closer to the market
center).
Finally, when t is high, the relevant outside option for type θ is not to buy in every location of the
firm’s market. In this case, for locations very close to the market center the firm is better off selling only
to type θ consumers. Again, the number of market regions depends on k (for very high k there exists
only a competitive region, for very low k there are monopolistic, intermediate and competitive regions.
Notice that, similarly to MNP , for a given k, as t rises we move to less competitive contracts. On
one hand, when k is low as t rises region M becomes larger and the region C smaller (∂d
∗
∂t and
∂dˆ
∂t are
both positive). On the other hand, for higher levels of k, as t rises competition is only relevant for type
θ consumers and, closer to the market center, firms do not sell to type θ consumers.
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3 Circular city oligopoly model
Since one of our objectives is to study the impact of the pricing policies on the market structure it is
convenient to extend the previous results to a circular city model with n firms. Consider n identical
firms simultaneously offering nonlinear contracts (price pi, quality ui) to consumers distributed on a unit
length circle. All firms have a fixed cost F and firms’ relocation is costless (i.e., we focus on spatial
contestability). We assume a location pattern where firms are equidistantly located around the circle31 :
an arc distance of 1n separates every two neighbor firms in the market.
Each firm i will always compete directly with two neighboring firms (the first firm located at its left
and the first at its right) implying that every firm deals with two independent symmetrical problems.
We will look for the equilibrium contracts between two of the n firms (let d1 = 0 and d2 = 1n) since the
reasoning would be similar for all the other pairs of firms32.
3.1 Mill nonlinear pricing
Lets us look for the case between two of the n firms when they simultaneously offer an unique nonlinear
contract — similar to 2.2. From the local monopoly analysis (see Appendix A) there are no local monopolies
at least for one type (type θ¯) as long as 0 < t < nθ¯
2
2 (Oligopoly NLM condition). Following the
same procedure as above and assuming that t belongs to the previous interval, we have to consider two
situations.
3.1.1 Market fully covered
Given the nonlinear contracts when n firms cover all the market for both types, the location, for each
type, where the consumers are indifferent between buying from firm 1 or firm 2 is now given by:
d˜θn =
1
2n
+
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
2t
Following an identical optimization procedure, the equilibrium solutions are similar to the linear city
duopoly model. Substituting t by tn at the prices and solutions intervals’ limits
33, we achieve the n firms
equilibrium solutions and the respective individual profit functions:
31Notice that this assumption is appealing since this location pattern is one of the possible locational equilibrium config-
urations. When firms practice delivered nonlinear pricing, firms choose locations at the median of their sales distribution
(Pires and Sarkar (2000), Pires (2002) and Hamilton and Thisse (1992)). If firms are equally spaced in the circle, each
firm’s equilibrium sales distribution will be symmetric around its location. But then the firm’s equilibrium location is at
the median of its sales distribution, thus the equally spaced configuration is an equilibrium of the two stage location-price
game. Kats (1995) shows that equally spaced location configuration is one of the possible equilibrium when firms practice
mill linear pricing. When firms practice mill nonlinear pricing and are equidistantly located around the circle, if a firm i
gets closer to the firm j (located at the right of firm i) it will rise the distance between firm i and firm l (located at the
left of firm i). As firms have competing firms at both sides of their location, the business stealing effect from getting closer
to one of the neighboring firms will cancel out by getting far from the other firm. When equally spaced in the circle, firms
will minimize transportation costs and steal the biggest share of the consumer surplus possible. For more discussion on
symmetric locational equilibrium see Eaton and Wooders (1985), Lederer and Hurter (1986), MacLeod et al. (1988) and
Novshek (1980).
32Firms’ profit function is achieved by duplicating the profits attained at the market region in analysis.
33For instance, Cθ¯ θ1 intervals’ limits - see appendix B - we get 0 <
t
n
<
θ2
3
⇔ 0 < t ≤ nθ
2
3
.
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Cθ¯ θ1
u = θ and p = θ
2
2 +
t
n
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 +
t
n
2t
n2 − F
Cθ¯ θ2
u = θ and p = θ2 − t2n
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 +
t
n
θ2
2n +
t
2n2 − F
3.1.2 Market fully covered only for type θ¯
When firms cover all the market for type θ¯ but not for type θ and considering dˆθ1 (as defined in equation
(2)), firm 1 will now solve:
max
(p¯1,u¯1)(p
1
,u1)
µ
p¯1 −
u¯21
2
¶
d˜θ¯n +
µ
p
1
− u
2
1
2
¶
dˆ
θ
1
Maintaining the same k intervals’ limits for each solution case but also substituting t by tn at the
prices and solutions intervals’ limits, we achieve the n firms equilibrium solutions and respective individual
profit functions34:
Sθ¯1 u = θ¯ and p =
θ¯2
2 +
t
n
t
n2 − F
Sθ¯2 u = θ¯ and p = θ¯
2 − t2n
θ¯2
2n −
t
2n2 − F
LMθ1
u = θ and p = 34θ
2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 +
t
n
θ4
8t +
t
n2 − F
LMθ2
u = θ and p = 34θ
2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2 − t2n
θ¯2
2n −
t
2n2 +
θ4
8t − F
3.1.3 Nash Equilibrium solution
We will also only have equilibrium solutions for all t < nθ¯
2
2 if k >
³
1 +
√
5
5
´
. After KT solution profits’
comparison for a given n and for all t and parameter types ratio k, we achieve a plot representing the
equilibrium as a function of the parameter values identical to the linear city duopoly one (Figure 1), but
where the scale of t is expressed in terms of nθ¯
2
.
All the described profit functions are decreasing with n for the parameters values where they are the
equilibrium solution. For a given n, the profit functions of Cθ¯ θ1 , C
θ¯ θ
2 , S
θ¯
1 and LM
θ
1 are increasing with
t whereas Sθ¯2 and LM
θ
2 profits are decreasing with t. There’s a profits discontinuity between LM
θ
1 and
Sθ¯1, C
θ¯ θ
2 and S
θ¯
1 and between Sθ¯2 and LM
θ
2.
3.2 Delivered nonlinear pricing
Suppose firms must simultaneously choose nonlinear contracts - similar to 2.3 - for all the locations in
the circle. The reasoning is similar to the linear city duopoly case but here the maximum net surplus
attained when buying from the most direct competitors is equal to θ
2
2 − t(
1
n − d). This change lead us to
the following types of contracts:
34Notice that the profits from the possible but undetermined solutions are equal to the profits of Sθ¯1 and S
θ¯
2 and their
intervals’ limits belong to these solutions intervals’ limits.
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Region Contracts
M equal to the linear city duopoly case
I
u1 =
nθ¯2+2tdn−2t
2(θ¯−θ)n and p1 =
nθθ¯2+2tdn(2θ−θ¯)−2θt
2(θ¯−θ)n
u¯1 = θ¯ and p¯1 = θ¯
2
2 − 2td+
t
n
C
u1 = θ and p1 = θ
2 − td
u¯1 = θ¯ and p¯1 = θ¯
2
2 − 2td+
t
n
FC
u1 = θ and p1 =
θ2
2 − 2td+
t
n
u¯1 = θ¯ and p¯1 = θ¯
2
2 − 2td+
t
n
The conclusions are analogue to the linear city duopoly case but with tn replacing t at the solutions
intervals’ limits. Figure 7 summarizes the results.
2 Reg*
3 Reg*
4 Reg*
2 Reg**
3 Reg** 1 Reg
2 Reg
3 Reg
4 Reg
Figure 7: Oligopoly Delivered Nonlinear Pricing Contracts
Firms’ profit functions for each equilibrium solution can be written as:
19
1Reg 2 ∗
nR 1
2n
0
h
θ¯2
2 − 2td+
t
n −
θ¯2
2 +
θ2
2 − 2td+
t
n −
θ2
2
i
dx
o
= tn2 − F
2Reg tn2 −
(2t−nθ2)2
4tn2 − F
3Reg tn2 −
(2t−nθ2)2
4tn2 −
[2t+n(2θ¯θ−θ¯2−2θ2)]3
24tn3(θ¯−θ)2 − F
4Reg tn2 −
(2t−nθ2)2
4tn2 +
[2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2)]3−[2t+n(2θ¯θ−θ¯2−2θ2)]3
24tn3(θ¯−θ)2 − F
2Reg∗ t2n2 +
θ4
4t − F
3Reg∗ t2n2 +
θ4
4t −
[2t+n(2θ¯θ−θ¯2−2θ2)]3
24tn3(θ¯−θ)2 − F
4Reg∗ t2n2 +
θ4
4t +
[2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2)]3−[2t+n(2θ¯θ−θ¯2−2θ2)]3
24tn3(θ¯−θ)2 − F
2Reg∗∗
(2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2))
£
3∗(nθ¯2−2t)(2t−(θ¯−2θ)2n)+2∗(2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2))2
¤
24t(θ¯−θ)2n3 +
+
£
−16n(θ¯−θ)2(2nθ¯θ−nθ¯2−2nθ2+t)
¤√
4(θ¯−θ)2n(n(−4θ¯θ+2θ¯2+4θ2)−2t)
24t(θ¯−θ)2n3 +
12n(θ¯−θ)2t2−24t(θ¯−θ)2n3F
24t(θ¯−θ)2n3
3Reg∗∗
(2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2))
£
3∗(nθ¯2−2t)(2t−(θ¯−2θ)2n)+3∗(2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2))2
¤
24t(θ¯−θ)2n3 +
+
£
−16n(θ¯−θ)2(2nθ¯θ−nθ¯2−2nθ2+t)
¤√
4(θ¯−θ)2n(n(−4θ¯θ+2θ¯2+4θ2)−2t)
24t(θ¯−θ)2n3 +
12n(θ¯−θ)2t2−24t(θ¯−θ)2n3F
24t(θ¯−θ)2n3
All the described profit functions are decreasing with n for the parameters where they are the equi-
librium solution. For a given n, the profit functions of 1Reg, 2Reg and 3Reg are always increasing with
t whereas in all the other solutions profit functions there are some parameters k / t where they are
decreasing / increasing with t. There is no profits discontinuity.
One important result in the circular city model, which holds both under MNP and DNP , is that
for given k and t, when n rises we move toward more competitive solutions. In addition, when n rises
the NLM limit also rises. That is, for given k, when more firms enter the market we must have higher
differentiation (higher t) in order to get local monopolies for both types of consumers.
If we compare profits for a given set of the exogenous parameters, t, θ, θ and F , for a given market
structure (given n), we get ambiguous results. For certain set of parameters’ values the two pricing
policies yield the same profits. For other parameters’ values MNP yields higher profits. Finally, there
are some set of parameters’ values for which DNP has higher profits (this happens at solution contracts
where the monopolistic region exists under DNP , i.e., for small levels of k and t close to the NLM
limit).
This last result is interesting because it contradicts the assertion that delivered pricing is more entry
deterrent than mill pricing. Our results show that this assertion is only valid when competition is effective
at all locations of the market. If firms are allowed to practise different nonlinear prices at each location
and competition is not relevant at locations closer to the firm, the firm will offer monopolistic nonlinear
contracts at these locations and may get higher profits than under MNP .
Since, for a given market structure, profits under MNP may be higher, equal or smaller than profits
under DNP , we also expect ambiguous results in the comparison of the free entry long-run equilibrium
number of firms under the two pricing policies.
3.3 Pricing policies and market structure
Let us now turn to the study of the market structure under the two pricing policies. The question we
want to answer is: for given values of the exogenous parameters, t, θ, θ and F , which is the free entry
long-run equilibrium number of firms for MNP (nMNP ) and DNP (nDNP )?
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Ignoring integer constraints, the free entry long-run equilibrium number of firms is such that all firms
in the market get zero profit. Thus, we just need to determine n such that each firm gets a zero profit.
However, this turns out to be quite complex since the profit function varies from solution contract to
solution contract, and which solution contract is relevant, for a given set of exogenous parameters, also
depends on n. What this implies is that, for each set of exogenous parameters, we need to identify
simultaneously which is the relevant solution contract (and consequently profit function to use) and the
number of firms such that this profit is zero35.
Due to the complexity of some profit functions36 and the need to guarantee that the free entry
long-run equilibrium number of firms and the profit function used are internally consistent, we had to
compute numerically the free entry long-run equilibrium number of firms for each pricing policy (nMNP
and nDNP ). Using Gauss programs, we computed, for different set of parameters t, θ, θ and F , the free
entry long-run number of firms for each of the possible equilibrium solution contracts (for MNP and for
DNP , separately). Then we checked which of those free entry long-run number of firms is really the
free entry long-run number of firms consistent with the parameters considered, i.e., for each of those free
entry long-run number of firms we checked if for the parameters t, θ, θ and F chosen we would be at set
of parameters where that equilibrium solution contract holds.
In section 4 we compare the free entry long-run equilibrium number of firms under the two pricing
policies, nMNP and nDNP .
3.4 Socially optimal market structure
The social net surplus for consumer θ at each location d is given by θu− td− u22 . Simple computations
reveal that u = θ is the socially optimal quality and the social net surplus from a consumer θ located at
d is given by θ
2
2 − td. Therefore, the social planner problem is easily described by:
max
nS ,d∗
θ¯
,d∗θ
2nS
"Z d∗θ¯
0
(
θ¯
2
2
− td) +
Z d∗θ
0
(
θ2
2
− td)
#
− nSF
subject to:
d∗θ¯ ≤
1
2n
d∗θ ≤
1
2n
and nS , d∗θ¯, d
∗
θ non-negative.
Notice that if d∗θ <
1
2n the market is not fully covered for type θ, thus the previous formulation allows
for the possibility of not covering all the market for one or for both types.
The socially optimal number of firms depends on the parameter values. When F ≤ θ
4
2t it is socially
optimal to cover all the market for both types and the optimal number of firms is given by:
nS =
r
t
2F
35For some set of parameters’ values, MNP may have two free entry long-run equilibrium number of firms solutions since
its profit functions happen to be discontinuous.
36Particularly, DNP solutions 2Reg∗∗ and 3Reg∗∗ need nonlinear equations software to solve it.
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When θ
4
2t ≤ F ≤
θ¯4+θ4
4t the market should not be fully covered for type θ and the optimal number of
firms is:
nS =
tp
4Ft− θ4
Finally, for F > θ¯
4+θ4
4t it is socially optimal not to serve the market (n
S = 0).
In section 4 we compare the socially optimal number of firms, nS , with the free entry long-run
equilibrium number of firms under the two pricing policies, nMNP and nDNP .
3.5 Welfare comparisons
Whether discriminatory nonlinear pricing should be prohibited or not depends on which of the two pricing
policies is better in welfare terms. Notice that this involves comparing welfare under MNP and under
DNP for different values of n, since the long-run market structure under the two pricing policies may
be different. Let us first derive the welfare function for each pricing policy and then compare welfare for
the various parameters’ values37.
With n firms the aggregate total surplus under mill nonlinear pricing, WMNP (n), is given by:
Contract Welfare — WMNP (n)
Cθ¯ θ1 = C
θ¯ θ
2
θ¯2
2 +
θ2
2 −
t
2n − nF
Sθ¯1 = Sθ¯2
θ¯2
2 −
t
4n − nF
LMθ1 = LM
θ
2
θ¯2
2 +
3nθ4
16t −
t
4n − nF
On the other hand, the welfare under delivered nonlinear pricing, WDNP (n), in each of the parameter
regions is given by:
37Notice that under both pricing policies the quality offered to type θ¯ is always the socially optimal quality (u¯ = θ¯). As
a consequence, for a given n, welfare differences between the two pricing policies are due exclusively to differences with
respect to type θ consumers’ net surplus.
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Region Welfare — WDNP (n)
1Reg θ¯
2
2 +
θ2
2 −
t
2n − nF
2Reg θ¯
2
2 +
θ2
2 −
t
2n − nF
3Reg θ¯
2
2 +
θ2
2 −
t
2n −
[2t+n(2θ¯θ−θ¯2−2θ2)]3
24tn2(θ¯−θ)2 − nF
4Reg θ¯
2
2 +
θ2
2 −
t
2n −
[2t+n(2θ¯θ−θ¯2−2θ2)]3
24tn2(θ¯−θ)2 +
[2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2)]2[2t+n(−6θ¯θ+3θ¯2+2θ2)]
24tn2(θ¯−θ)2 − nF
2Reg∗
nθ4
4t +
θ¯2
2 −
t
4n − nF
3Reg∗
nθ4
4t +
θ¯2
2 −
t
4n −
[2t+n(2θ¯θ−θ¯2−2θ2)]3
24tn2(θ¯−θ)2 − nF
4Reg∗
nθ4
4t +
θ¯2
2 −
t
4n −
[2t+n(2θ¯θ−θ¯2−2θ2)]3
24tn2(θ¯−θ)2 +
[2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2)]2[2t+n(−6θ¯θ+3θ¯2+2θ2)]
24tn2(θ¯−θ)2 − nF
2Reg∗∗
θ¯2
2 −
t
4n − nF+
+ 1
4(θ¯−θ)2n
⎡
⎢⎣
³
2t+ n(6θ¯θ − 3θ¯2 − 4θ2)
´
3∗(nθ¯2−2t)(2t−(θ¯−2θ)2n)+2∗(2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2))2
6tn +
+
£
−16n(θ¯−θ)2(2nθ¯θ−nθ¯2−2nθ2+t)
¤√
4(θ¯−θ)2n(n(−4θ¯θ+2θ¯2+4θ2)−2t)
6tn
⎤
⎥⎦
3Reg∗∗
θ¯2
2 −
t
4n +
[2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2)]2[2t+n(−6θ¯θ+3θ¯2+2θ2)]
24tn2(θ¯−θ)2 − nF+
+ 1
4(θ¯−θ)2n
⎡
⎢⎣
³
2t+ n(6θ¯θ − 3θ¯2 − 4θ2)
´
3∗(nθ¯2−2t)(2t−(θ¯−2θ)2n)+2∗(2t+n(6θ¯θ−3θ¯2−4θ2))2
6tn +
+
£
−16n(θ¯−θ)2(2nθ¯θ−nθ¯2−2nθ2+t)
¤√
4(θ¯−θ)2n(n(−4θ¯θ+2θ¯2+4θ2)−2t)
6tn
⎤
⎥⎦
After computing nMNP and nDNP for given values of t, θ, θ and F , we can compare WMNP (nMNP )
with WDNP (nDNP ).
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4 Numerical results
As mentioned previously we used Gauss to compute numerically the free entry number of firms under
each pricing policy for different sets of parameter values. In each of our simulations, we fixed θ and F
and computed the long run equilibrium for a large grid of values for k and t. We ran several of these
simulations, considering different values of θ and F . Obviously, the equilibrium number of firms and the
welfare levels under each pricing policy depend a lot on the parameter values. However, the qualitative
results on the comparison of the two pricing policies are the same in all the simulations we have performed.
4.1 Free Entry number of firms
Our numerical computations show that for low k (similar types) and t high (close to the NLM limit),
nDNP is higher or equal38 to nMNP . For this set of parameters’ values, DNP solution contracts have
firms setting the typical asymmetric information monopolist contract at locations near the firms and this
fact outweighs the competitive pressure of delivered pricing policies. Also notice that MNP solution
contracts have firms selling only to type θ. As a consequence, for a given n, profits are higher under
DNP , which leads to a larger number of firms in the long-run.
For all the other sets of parameters, nMNP is higher than nDNP . If k is higher (or t is lower), the firm
is not able to set monopoly contracts even for locations near the firm (there is no region M). Therefore,
DNP has more competitive contracts and firms achieve lower profits which implies lower entry.
Figure 8 exemplifies the results of our simulations, when θ = 2 and F = 0.2. The first plot shows
that for k low and high t the free entry number of firms is larger under DNP . However, the previous
result only holds at a small region in the parameters’ space. For higher k or/and smaller t the long run
equilibrium number of firms is larger under MNP .
Figure 8: Free entry long-run number of firms.
Our results also emphasize the fact that there exists excess entry under both pricing policies, as nS
is always lower than nMNP and nDNP . In addition, the excess entry distortion is lower for low t (see
Figure 8).
As expected, the free entry number of firms is decreasing with F and increasing with θ, under both
pricing policies.
38Notice that the second solution that may appear with MNP has nDNP is equal to nMNP . This only occurs when k
is low and t is low/intermediate.
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4.2 Welfare
We reach always higher free entry long-run aggregate total surplus with DNP , although for low t,
WDNP (nDNP ) is very close to WMNP (nMNP ). When t rises, the difference between these welfare levels
increases (see for instance when θ = 2 and F = 0.2 at Figure 9). As in the standard Hotelling model, for
both pricing policies welfare decreases when t rises.
Figure 9: Free entry long-run Welfare
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5 Conclusion
The issue of whether price discrimination should be prohibited has been previously addressed in a setup
where consumer differ according to one observable characteristic (location). Under this setup mill linear
pricing and delivered linear pricing have been compared and it has been shown that, if there’s spatial
contestability (firms can costless relocate), then in the long-run delivered linear pricing yields higher
welfare, and, consequently, discriminatory prices should be allowed.
This paper considers a model where consumers simultaneously differ according to one unobservable
(quality preferences) and one observable characteristic (location - brand preferences). In these circum-
stances nonlinear prices arise in equilibrium. The main question addressed in this work is whether firms
should be allowed to discriminate according to the observable characteristic. In other words, should firms
be allowed to practise different nonlinear contracts at each location or should they be forced to set an
unique nonlinear contract?
We showed that, when firms can costless relocate and set nonlinear contracts to screen consumers
according to their preference for quality, delivered nonlinear pricing may bring smaller, equal or higher
free entry equilibrium number of firms than mill nonlinear pricing, depending on the degree of asymmetric
information and the degree of differentiation. The fact that the number of product varieties (free entry
number of firms) may be higher under delivered nonlinear pricing is not present at Norman and Thisse
(1996) and occurs when consumers types are more similar and differentiation is close to the level where
local monopolies start to appear.
Our results corroborate Norman and Thisse (1996), under spatial contestability, in terms of too much
product variety (excess of entry) with both mill nonlinear pricing and delivered nonlinear pricing since
the free entry social optimal number of firms is always smaller than the free entry equilibrium number of
firms when setting mill nonlinear pricing and delivered nonlinear pricing. This also happens in terms of
welfare, since in the long-run delivered nonlinear pricing yields higher welfare than mill nonlinear pricing,
thus, our results, support the view that discriminatory nonlinear prices should not be prohibited.
Besides extending previous results on the desirability of price discrimination according to some ob-
servable characteristic, our work provides a comparison of mill nonlinear pricing and delivered nonlinear
pricing which is interesting on its own as these two pricing policies have not been compared before.
Interesting extensions of our work would be to consider scenarios where we have a different proportion
of types at each location or where brand preferences interact with quality preferences.
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Appendix
A Monopoly analysis
Consider a monopolist located at dm = 0. In this section we analyze the monopolist mill and delivered
nonlinear contracts.
A.1 Mill nonlinear pricing
When the monopolist is not allowed to offer different nonlinear contracts at each location, his demand
from type θ consumers is determined by the location, dˆθm, where type θ is indifferent between buying
from him or not buying at all:
θ ui − tdˆθm − pi = 0 ⇔ dˆθm =
θ ui − pi
t
.
If the monopolist sells to both types of consumers, he will offer (p¯m, u¯m) and (pm, um) that solve the
following problem:
max
(p¯m,u¯m),(p
m
,um)
µ
p¯m −
u¯2m
2
¶
dˆθ¯m +
µ
p
m
− u
2
m
2
¶
dˆ
θ
m
subject to incentive compatibility constraints and feasibility constraints:
IC θ¯ : θ¯u¯m − p¯m ≥ θ¯um − pm
ICθ : θ um − pm ≥ θu¯m − p¯m
FC : 0 ≤ dˆθm ≤ 1 for θ = θ, θ
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions have multiple solutions39. Obviously, the solution of the monopolist
problem is the one which yields the highest profit. Therefore, the optimal nonlinear contracts, which
hold for different parameters sets, are given by:
Sol. 1
um = 2θ − θ¯ and pm = θ(2θ − θ¯)− t
u¯m = θ¯ and p¯m = θ¯
2
+ (θ − θ¯)(2θ − θ¯)− t
Sol. 2 um = θ¯ and pm = θ¯
2 − t
Sol. 3
um = θ and pm =
3
4θ
2
u¯m = θ¯ and p¯m = θ¯
2 − t
Sol. 4 um = θ¯ and pm = 34 θ¯
2
Sol. 5
um = θ and pm =
3
4θ
2
u¯m = θ¯ and p¯m = 34 θ¯
2
Incentive Compatibility Constraints are not binding, except at Sol. 1 (where IC θ¯ binds). At Sol.
1, Sol. 2 and Sol. 3, the monopolist covers all the market for type θ¯ (that is, dˆθ¯m = 1). Notice that
the quality offered by the monopolist to each type is the socially optimal, except for type θ at Sol. 1.
39We also achieved some undetermined solutions which could be represented by one of the stated solutions since the profits
from these possible but undetermined solutions are equal to the profits of other determined solutions and their intervals’
limits belong to the determined solutions intervals’ limits.
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However, for certain parameters’ values, the monopolist offers a product quality such that no consumer
of type θ buys - Sol. 2 and Sol. 4.
At Sol. 4 and Sol. 5, the monopolist stops covering all the market for type θ¯. Under these optimal
nonlinear contracts, dˆθ¯m =
θ¯2
4t . Since dˆ
θ
m is decreasing with t, for sufficiently high levels of differentiation
we will have dˆθm <
1
2 :
dˆθ¯m =
θ¯
2
4t
<
1
2
⇔ t > θ¯
2
2
.
For this differentiation degree interval, if we consider two identical firms located at the extremes of
the unit length line, we get local monopolies (LM) for type θ¯ as each firm covers less than half the market
(Sol 4LM and Sol 5LM ). Notice that for a given t, dˆθ¯m is always higher than dˆ
θ
m, therefore, we may have
local monopolies for type θ for even lower levels of t. Local monopolies for type θ arise when t > θ¯
2
4 (and
k > 3).
Figure 10 shows the parameters’ values sets where each solution holds40.
2
4
6
8
10
2 3 4 5 61.5
Sol. 2
Sol. 4
Sol. 3
Sol. 5Sol. 4 LM Sol. 5 LM
Sol. 1
Figure 10: Monopolist Mill Nonlinear Pricing Contracts
Discussion of results under monopolist mill nonlinear pricing When k is low, the monopolist
sells only to type θ¯’s consumers except for very low t. When k is high, the monopolist continues to prefer
to sell only to type θ¯ until an intermediate level of t (since taking all the possible type θ¯’s consumers’
net surplus maximizes its profits). But when t increases, the monopolist starts selling both types since
screening becomes more profitable (first covering all the market for type θ¯ and then, when t rises even
more, not covering all the market for both types)41.
40For k close to 1 and high t, there’s a pooling equilibrium solution. This region is not represented in the figure 10.
41 If we substitute t by t
n
at the prices and solutions intervals’ limits, the previous solutions stand for the case where we
consider a monopolist selling in a market whose length is 1
n
.
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A.2 Delivered nonlinear pricing
Let us now assume that the monopolist is allowed to offer different nonlinear contracts at each location
(p¯m(d), u¯m(d) and pm(d), um(d)). When he considers selling to both types, at each location d, he solves
the following problem:
max
(p¯m,u¯m)(p
m
,um)
p
m
− u
2
m
2
+ p¯m −
u¯2m
2
subject to:
IRP θ¯ : θ¯u¯m − td− p¯m ≥ 0
IRP θ : θ um − td− pm ≥ 0
IC θ¯ : θ¯u¯m − p¯m ≥ θ¯um − pm
ICθ : θ um − pm ≥ θu¯m − p¯m
Notice that IRP θ¯ is redundant given IC θ¯ and IRP θ. When k ≤ 2, we get the typical asymmetric
information monopolist contract, with IC θ¯ and IRP θ binding, the quality offered to type θ¯ is the socially
efficient but the quality consumed by type θ is sub optimal. The optimal contract and profits are given
by:
um = 2θ − θ¯ and pm = θ(2θ − θ¯)− td
u¯m = θ¯ and p¯m = θ¯
2
+ (θ − θ¯)(2θ − θ¯)− td
πm = θ¯
2 − 2θ¯θ + 2θ2 − 2td
The monopolist will set this contract for a given t, only until the location d where πm > 0.
The monopolist can also choose to sell only to type θ¯ and the maximization problem is:
max
(p¯m,u¯m)
p¯m −
u¯2m
2
subject to:
IRP θ¯ : θ¯u¯m − td− p¯m ≥ 0
The unique solution has IRP θ¯ binding with u¯m = θ¯ and p¯m = θ¯
2 − td. Type θ consumers prefer not
to buy under these conditions and profits at location d are equal to θ¯
2
2 − td. Also the monopolist will set
this contract for a given t, only until the location d where πm > 0.
For k ≤ 2, comparing the profits in these two possible cases, we conclude that for t < (θ¯−2θ)
2
2 the
monopolist sells to both types at every location. If t > (θ¯−2θ)
2
2 , the monopolist only serves both types
until location d¯ = (θ¯−2θ)
2
2t
42 . Notice that for t > (θ¯ − 2θ)2, the monopolist sells to type θ only for
locations to the left of the center of the market (d¯ < 12). As a consequence, if we consider two identical
firms operating at the extremes of the unit line, we may have local monopolies for type θ. Due to the
non-negativity profits condition, as t rises the monopolist stops covering all the market (even for type θ¯’s
consumers - the monopolist only set the contract described above until d¯θ¯ = θ¯
2
2t ). Therefore, for t > θ¯
2
,
we achieve local monopolies for both types.
For k > 2, it is optimal for the monopolist to sell only to type θ¯ (for these levels of k that is the
unique solution of the KT conditions). Also, due to the non-negativity profits condition, as t rises the
42Afterwards, the monopolist sells only to type θ¯ - by doing so the monopolist is able to extract an higher surplus from
these consumers than if he also offered a price-quality contract to type θ consumers.
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monopolist stops covering all the market (sells until d¯θ¯) and for t > θ¯
2
, we achieve local monopolies for
type θ¯’s consumers43 .
Discussion of results under monopolist delivered nonlinear pricing When k is high, the mo-
nopolist sells only to type θ¯’s consumers (first covering all the market for type θ¯ and then, when t rises,
stop doing so). Notice that the monopolist takes all the net surplus of type θ¯’s consumers.
When k is low, the monopolist always sells to both types at locations near it (covering all the market
for low t) but for locations near the market center the monopolist sells only to type θ¯’s consumers. As
t rises, the locations where the monopolist sells both types decrease since the monopolist prefers to sell
only to type θ¯ than selling both types and thus leaving more net surplus to type θ¯’s consumers.
43The t intervals’ limits described above are different if we consider a market with length 1
n
. To get the solutions for this
case we must substitute t for t
n
only at the t intervals’ limits.
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B Kuhn-Tucker conditions of firm 1’s problem
B.1 Mill nonlinear pricing - Market fully covered
Let σ1, δ1, λ1, ρ1 and µ1j be the lagrangian multipliers (j = 1, ..., 4) associated with IRP
θ¯, IRP θ, IC θ¯,
ICθ and FC, respectively. We can construct the Lagrangian:
L =
µ
p¯1 −
u¯21
2
¶µ
1
2
+
θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2t
¶
+
µ
p
1
− u
2
1
2
¶Ã
1
2
+
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
2t
!
+
+σ1
∙
θ¯u¯1 −
t
2
− θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2
− p¯1
¸
+
+δ1
"
θ u1 −
t
2
−
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
2
− p
1
#
+
+λ1
h
θ¯u¯1 − p¯1 − θ¯u1 + p1
i
+
+ρ1
h
θ u1 − p1 − θu¯1 + p¯1
i
+
+µ11
∙
1
2
+
θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2t
¸
+
+µ12
∙
1
2
− θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2t
¸
+
+µ13
"
1
2
+
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
2t
#
+
+µ14
"
1
2
−
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
2t
#
The KT conditions when all p and u must be non-negative are given by:
∂L
∂p¯1
= t+ θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − 2p¯1 +
u¯21
2
− tσ1 − 2tλ1 + 2tρ1 − µ11 + µ12 ≤ 0;
p¯1 ≥ 0; p¯1
∂L
∂p¯1
= 0
∂L
∂p
1
= t+ θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − 2p1 +
u21
2
− tδ1 + 2tλ1 − 2tρ1 − µ13 + µ14 ≤ 0;
p
1
≥ 0; p
1
∂L
∂p
1
= 0
∂L
∂u¯1
= −u¯1
¡
t+ θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
¢
+ θ¯
µ
p¯1 −
u¯21
2
¶
+ θ¯tσ1 + 2tθ¯λ1 − 2tθρ1 + θ¯µ11 − θ¯µ12 ≤ 0;
u¯1 ≥ 0; u¯1
∂L
∂u¯1
= 0
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∂L
∂u1
= −u1
³
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
´
+ θ
µ
p
1
− u
2
1
2
¶
+ tθδ1 − 2tθ¯λ1 + 2tθρ1 + θµ13 − θµ14 ≤ 0;
u1 ≥ 0;u1
∂L
∂u1
= 0
∂L
∂σ1
= θ¯u¯1 −
t
2
− θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2
− p¯1 ≥ 0; σ1 ≥ 0; σ1
∂L
∂σ1
= 0
∂L
∂δ1
= θ u1 −
t
2
−
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
2
− p
1
≥ 0; δ1 ≥ 0; δ1
∂L
∂δ1
= 0
∂L
∂λ1
= θ¯u¯1 − p¯1 − θ¯u1 + p1 ≥ 0; λ1 ≥ 0; λ1
∂L
∂λ1
= 0
∂L
∂ρ1
= θ u1 − p1 − θu¯1 + p¯1 ≥ 0; ρ1 ≥ 0; ρ1
∂L
∂ρ1
= 0
∂L
∂µ11
=
1
2
+
θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2t
≥ 0; µ11 ≥ 0; µ11
∂L
∂µ11
= 0
∂L
∂µ12
=
1
2
− θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2t
≥ 0; µ12 ≥ 0; µ12
∂L
∂µ12
= 0
∂L
∂µ13
=
1
2
+
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
2t
≥ 0; µ13 ≥ 0; µ13
∂L
∂µ13
= 0
∂L
∂µ14
=
1
2
−
θ(u1 − u2) + p2 − p1
2t
≥ 0; µ14 ≥ 0; µ14
∂L
∂µ14
= 0
The symmetric equilibrium solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions are:
• when no constraint is binding:
Sol. I. = Cθ¯ θ1 0 < t ≤
θ2
3
u = θ and p = θ
2
2 + t
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 + t
• when IRP θ is the only binding constraint:
Sol. II. = Cθ¯ θ2
θ2
3 < t <
³
θ2
3 +
(θ¯−θ)2
3
´ u = θ and p = θ2 − t2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 + t
B.2 Mill nonlinear pricing - Market only fully covered for type θ¯
Let σ1, δ1, λ1, ρ1 and µ1j be the lagrangian multipliers (j = 1, ..., 4) associated with IRP
θ¯, IRP θ, IC θ¯,
ICθ and FC, respectively. We can construct the Lagrangian:
L =
µ
p¯1 −
u¯21
2
¶µ
1
2
+
θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2t
¶
+
µ
p
1
− u
2
1
2
¶µ
θ ui − pi
t
¶
+
+σ1
∙
θ¯u¯1 −
t
2
− θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2
− p¯1
¸
+
+λ1
h
θ¯u¯1 − p¯1 − θ¯u1 + p1
i
+
+ρ1
h
θ u1 − p1 − θu¯1 + p¯1
i
+
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+µ11
∙
1
2
+
θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2t
¸
+
+µ12
∙
1
2
− θ¯(u¯1 − u¯2) + p¯2 − p¯1
2t
¸
+
+µ13
∙
θ u1 − p1
t
¸
+
+µ14
∙
1−
θ u2 − p2
t
−
θ u1 − p1
t
¸
We get the same KT conditions as the previous case except for:
∂L
∂p
1
= θ ui − 2pi +
u21
2
− tδ1 + tλ1 − tρ1 − µ13 + µ14 ≤ 0;
p
1
≥ 0; p
1
∂L
∂p
1
= 0
∂L
∂u1
= −u1
³
θ ui − pi
´
+ θ
µ
p
1
− u
2
1
2
¶
− tθ¯λ1 + tθρ1 + θµ13 − θµ14 ≤ 0;
u1 ≥ 0;u1
∂L
∂u1
= 0
∂L
∂µ13
=
θ u1 − p1
t
≥ 0; µ13 ≥ 0; µ13
∂L
∂µ13
= 0
∂L
∂µ14
= 1−
θ u2 − p2
t
−
θ u1 − p1
t
≥ 0; µ14 ≥ 0; µ14
∂L
∂µ14
= 0
The symmetric simultaneous solutions of the KT conditions are:
• when no constraint is binding:
Sol. III. = Sθ¯1 k >
6
5 and
θ¯(2θ−θ¯)
2 < t ≤
θ¯2
3
u = 0 and p = 0
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 + t
Sol. VII.
2 < k ≤
¡
6 + 2
√
6
¢
and 0 < t < (θ¯−2θ)
2
2
or k >
¡
6 + 2
√
6
¢
and 0 < t ≤ θ¯
2
3
u = 2θ and p = 2θ2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 + t
Sol. V. = LMθ1
³
1 +
√
2
2
´
< k ≤
³
3 + 3
√
2
2
´
and θ
2
2 < t <
(θ¯−2θ)2+θ¯2−θ2
4
or k >
³
3 + 3
√
2
2
´
and θ
2
2 < t ≤
θ¯2
3
u = θ and p = 34θ
2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 + t
• when IRP θ¯ is the only binding constraint:
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Sol. IV. = Sθ¯2 k >
6
5 and
θ¯2
3 < t < 2θ¯(θ¯ − θ)
u = 0 and p = 0
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2 − t2
Sol. VIII.
2 < k ≤
¡
6 + 2
√
6
¢
and 4θ(θ¯ − θ) < t < 2θ¯(θ¯ − θ)
or k >
¡
6 + 2
√
6
¢
and θ¯
2
3 < t < 2θ¯(θ¯ − θ)
u = 2θ and p = 2θ2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2 − t2
Sol. VI. = LMθ2
2 < k ≤
³
3 + 3
√
2
2
´
and 2θ
¡
θ¯ − 34θ
¢
< t <
(θ¯−θ)2+θ¯2
2
or k >
³
3 + 3
√
2
2
´
and θ¯
2
3 < t <
(θ¯−θ)2+θ¯2
2
u = θ and p = 34θ
2
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2 − t2
• when only IC θ¯ and NNθ constraints bind:
Sol. IX.
2 < k ≤
¡
6 + 2
√
6
¢
and 0 < t < (θ¯−2θ)
2
2
or k >
¡
6 + 2
√
6
¢
and 0 < t < θ¯
2
3
u =
2t−θ2
2(θ−θ¯) and p =
2t−θ2
2(θ−θ¯)θ
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2
2 + t
• when ICθ is the only constraint not binding:
Sol. X.
2 < k ≤
¡
6 + 2
√
6
¢
and 4θ(θ¯ − θ) < t < 2θ¯(θ¯ − θ)
or k >
¡
6 + 2
√
6
¢
and θ¯
2
3 < t < 2θ¯(θ¯ − θ)
u = t
2(θ¯−θ) and p =
t
2(θ¯−θ)θ
u¯ = θ¯ and p¯ = θ¯
2 − t2
B.3 Delivered nonlinear pricing - t < θ
2
2
Let σ1, δ1, λ1and ρ1 be the lagrangian multipliers associated with IR
θ¯, IRθ, IC θ¯ and ICθ, respectively.
We can construct the Lagrangian:
L =
µ
p¯1 −
u¯21
2
¶
+
µ
p
1
− u
2
1
2
¶
+
+σ1
"
θ¯u¯1 − td− p¯1 −
θ¯
2
2
+ t(1− d)
#
+
+δ1
∙
θ u1 − td− p1 −
θ2
2
+ t(1− d)
¸
+
+λ1
h
θ¯u¯1 − p¯1 − θ¯u1 + p1
i
+
+ρ1
h
θ u1 − p1 − θu¯1 + p¯1
i
The KT conditions when all p and u must be non-negative are given by:
∂L
∂p¯1
= 1− σ1 − λ1 + ρ1 ≤ 0; p¯1 ≥ 0; p¯1
∂L
∂p¯1
= 0
∂L
∂p
1
= 1− δ1 + λ1 − ρ1 ≤ 0; p1 ≥ 0; p1
∂L
∂p
1
= 0
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∂L
∂u¯1
= −u¯1 + θ¯σ1 + θ¯λ1 − θρ1 ≤ 0; u¯1 ≥ 0; u¯1
∂L
∂u¯1
= 0
∂L
∂u1
= −u1 + θδ1 − θ¯λ1 + θρ1 ≤ 0; u1 ≥ 0;u1
∂L
∂u1
= 0
∂L
∂σ1
= θ¯u¯1 − td− p¯1 −
θ¯
2
2
+ t(1− d) ≥ 0; σ1 ≥ 0; σ1
∂L
∂σ1
= 0
∂L
∂δ1
= θ u1 − td− p1 −
θ2
2
+ t(1− d) ≥ 0; δ1 ≥ 0; δ1
∂L
∂δ1
= 0
∂L
∂λ1
= θ¯u¯1 − p¯1 − θ¯u1 + p1 ≥ 0; λ1 ≥ 0; λ1
∂L
∂λ1
= 0
∂L
∂ρ1
= θ u1 − p1 − θu¯1 + p¯1 ≥ 0; ρ1 ≥ 0; ρ1
∂L
∂ρ1
= 0
B.4 Delivered nonlinear pricing - θ2 ≤ t < θ¯
2
2
Let σ1, δ1, λ1and ρ1 be the lagrangian multipliers associated with IR
θ¯, IRθ, IC θ¯ and ICθ, respectively.
We can construct the Lagrangian:
L =
µ
p¯1 −
u¯21
2
¶
+
µ
p
1
− u
2
1
2
¶
+
+σ1
"
θ¯u¯1 − td− p¯1 −
θ¯
2
2
+ t(1− d)
#
+
+δ1
h
θ u1 − td− p1
i
+
+λ1
h
θ¯u¯1 − p¯1 − θ¯u1 + p1
i
+
+ρ1
h
θ u1 − p1 − θu¯1 + p¯1
i
We get the same KT conditions identical to the previous case except for:
∂L
∂δ1
= θ u1 − td− p1 ≥ 0; δ1 ≥ 0; δ1
∂L
∂δ1
= 0
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